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Abstract
The objective of this study is to measure the amount of market power
exercised by the U.S. red meatpacking industry using the recently developed
stochastic frontier estimator of market power. The aggregate degree of market
power in both the input market (cattle and hogs) and the output market (beef
and pork) is estimated using annual time series data for the period 1970-
2009. The empirical results reveal that the farm-to-wholesale price spread is
4.91% and 4.16% above the marginal processing costs, in the beef and pork
packing industries, respectively. These findings indicate that rather a small
percentage of the farm-to-wholesale price spread can be attributed to market
power in both U.S. meat packing sectors.
Keywords: beef; pork; stochastic frontier analysis; market power
JEL classification: Q11, C13, L66.
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1 Introduction
Red meat production is the largest segment in the agricultural sector of the U.S.
economy and one of the most researched industries. It encompasses the farm-to-
retail transformation of beef and pork.1 The U.S. meat industry accounts for more
than $100 billion (USDA 2014) in annual sales and half a million employees.
Over the last years, meat–packing firms have increased in size and scope through
mergers, acquisitions and vertical coordination. More cattle and hogs are now pro-
cured through contracts, also know as captive supplies, giving rise to concerns that
packers are “manipulating” cash prices in order to influence the base price used to
negotiate contracts. As a result, the U.S. meat packing industry has many times
been at the center of controversy regarding the conditions of competition in both
the livestock procurement and wholesale meat markets (Azzam, 1998; Saitone and
Sexton, 2012; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2009).
Regarding the U.S. beef industry, between 1980 and 2012, the number of plants
decreased from 704 to 168 and the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) increased
from 35.7% to 85% (United States Department of Agriculture – Packers and Stock-
yards Program, 2014). The CR4 has remained around 80% in the last ten years.2 At
the same time, the U.S. hog industry has also undergone major structural changes
in the last 30 years. According to the Daily Livestock Report released by CME
Group (2014), the top four packers control two thirds of the market.
Estimating the degree of oligopsony and oligopoly power along the U.S. meat
supply chain has been the focus of many studies. The most influential research in
the past few years has been the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO),
which is an econometric approach that treats market power as a parameter to be
inferred from single industries data (Bresnahan, 1989). Azzam (1998) summarizes
1Red meat includes beef, pork, veal, lamb and mutton. Beef and pork account for more than
99% of the red meat production.
2Although concentration data are useful for describing an industry, high levels of concentration
is not a sufficient condition to conclude that firms engage in non-competitive behavior (McCorris-
ton, 2002).
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the results of NEIO studies that tested for the presence of market power in both the
input (livestock) and the output market (processed meat) in the meat, beef and pork
packing industries. The majority of the studies report evidence of market power in
the input and/or in the output market.
In the U.S. beef sector, Schroeter (1988) finds evidence of oligopsonistic and
oligopolistic power exercised by beef processors. Azzam (1992) reports significant
findings of oligopsonistic power but finds no evidence of oligopolistic power. Cai
et al. (2011a,b) have concluded that processors exert oligopsonistic power when
purchasing finished cattle for slaughter. In the U.S. pork packing industry, the
empirical results of Azzam et al. (1989) reveal significant evidence of oligopsonistic
as well as oligopolistic power exercised by pork processors. Schroeter and Azzam
(1990) report statistical significant evidence of oligopsonistic power exercised by
pork packing firms.
According to some studies, the magnitude of market power in the U.S. red meat
industry is relatively small or is not large enough to warrant concern (Azzam and
Schroeter, 1991; Schroeter, 1988; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
2009). But, as Sexton (2013) points out, even modest departures from perfect com-
petition – relatively weak oligopoly or oligopsony power especially in the red meat
industry – should matter. According to Ward (2010), a small degree of market power
can translate into large transfers from livestock producers to packers: a seemingly
small impact in dollars per hundredweight can make a substantial difference (losses)
to livestock producers.
Lastly, there are studies that found no evidence of market power or concluded
that the efficiency effects are larger than the market power effects of increased con-
centration (Paul, 2001a,b; Schroeter and Azzam, 1991; Sperling, 2002; U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), 2009).
In the light of the preceding, the objective of the present work is to estimate
the aggregate degree of market power–oligopolistic and oligopsonistic– in the U.S.
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beef and pork packing industries, with the use of the recently developed stochastic
frontier approach (SFA) by Khumbhakar, Baardsen and Lien (2012).
In their original work, Kumbhakar et al. (2012) propose a new method of mar-
ket power estimation. They draw on the stochastic frontier methodology from the
efficiency literature in order to estimate mark–ups in the Norwegian saw-milling
industry. The authors use both primal and dual specifications to represent the tech-
nology and consequently estimate the degree of oligopoly power. Both approaches
reveal statistically significant evidence of market power. The primal and dual spec-
ifications of the technology is a big advantage of the stochastic frontier approach of
market power estimation: in an output market, based on duality theory of cost and
input–distance functions, either input price data or quantity price data can be used.
On the other hand, duality of revenue functions and output distance functions can
be utilized for an input market.
In the most recent and related study, Lopez et al. (2015) used the stochastic
frontier approach in order to estimate oligopoly power in the U.S. food industry for
the period 1979–2009. The stochastic frontier estimator of market power was evalu-
ated with the use of panel data in 36 U.S. food industries at the four digit Standard
Industrial Classification System (SIC) provided by the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database. The estimated value of the overall mean degree of market power
was found to be 6.4%, indicating that all 36 food industries, in the sample, exercise
some degree of oligopoly power but quite moderate. In the meat–packing sector,
the estimated value of the stochastic frontier estimator of market power was 0.037,
indicating that the price of the meat output is 3.7% above the marginal cost of
production.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no published work which has
used the stochastic frontier approach in order to explicitly estimate the degree of
aggregate market power in the US beef and pork packing industries.
The present work is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the theoretical
5
framework, Section 3 the aggregate model and Section 4 the data and estimation
results. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Meat packing firm
The starting point of this study is the profit maximizing meat packing firm that
produces either beef or pork.3 Each firm purchases a homogeneous farm input xi
(cattle or hogs) and produces a homogeneous output qi (beef or pork). On aggregate,
the meat packing industry consists of N firms purchasing input X=
∑N
i=1 xi and
producing good Q=
∑N
i=1 qi. Packers have market power in the farm input market
as well as in the processed output market.4
The supply function for the farm input is given by:
W = W (X) (1)
where W is the price of input X.
At wholesale level, the inverse demand for the processed good is given by:
P = P (Q) (2)
where P is the price of the processed meat output.
This article assumes fixed proportional relationship between the livestock and the
processed meat output. Hence, farm and wholesale quantities can be measured, with
3Mergers and acquisitions in the U.S meatpacking industry have resulted in multi–output firms,
i.e. firms slaughtering both beef and pork. The present study considers firms that produce either
beef or pork. Hence, one could also assume the unit of analysis to be either the meatpacking plant
or a single firm operating multiple plants.
4There are also high levels of concentration at the retail level of the meat industry. Accordingly,
at the last stage of the meat marketing channel we find firms with potentially high degree of market
power as well. This work focuses on the estimation of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic power exerted
by meat processors and does not model for bilateral oligopoly power between packers and retailers.
6
appropriate conversion, by the same variable. Technology for each meat–packer is
represented by the processing cost function C(qi,r,t), where r is a vector of non-farm
input prices and t captures the state of technology.
The profits for the ith meat packer are given by:
Πi = P (Q) qi − Ci (qi, r, t)−W (X)xi (3)
Each processor chooses qi to maximize profits. The first order condition is:
dΠi
dqi
=
d
dqi
P (Q) qi − d
dqi
Ci(qi, r, t)− d
dqi
W (X)xi = 0 (4)
Taking into account that fixed proportions technology means xi = qi and X = Q,
equation 4 yields:
P − λi
η
P −MCi −W − φi

W = 0 (5)
where η = −dQ/dP
Q/P
is the elasticity of demand of the processed meat–output,
λi =
dQ/dqi
Q/qi
is the conjectural variation elasticity for the ith processor in the output
market,  =
dX/dW
X/W
is the elasticity of supply of the farm–input, φi =
dX/dxi
X/xi
is
the conjectural variation elasticity for the ith processor in the farm input market
and MCi = C ′i(qi, r, t) is the packer’s marginal processing cost.
Re–arranging equation 5 we get:
(P −W )−MCi = λi
η
P +
φi

W (6)
The term in parenthesis on the left hand side of equation 6 represents the farm-
to-wholesale price spread. The terms on the right hand side of equation 6 measure
oligopolistic and oligopsonistic power respectively. The first term, λi
η
P , accounts for
the market power exercised in the output market by the ith processor. Parameter λi
captures the increase in total processed output induced by an increase in processor
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i’s output. The second term, φi

W , accounts for the market power exercised by the
ith processor in the input market. Parameter φi captures the increase in the supply
of the farm input at industry level induced by an increase in processor i’s demand
for the farm input. The parameters λi and φi assume values greater than zero or
equal to zero. In the case where both parameters λi and φi are zero, then there is
no market power exercised by the ith processor in the output market as well as in
the input market. In this case, equation 6 is written as:
P −W = MCi (7)
The farm-to-wholesale spread is the competitive benchmark, i.e. price–taking pack-
ers receive a margin equal to their marginal processing cost indicating no market
power exertion in the input market as well as the output market. On the other
hand, oligopolistic and oligopsonistic distortions of equation 6 are captured by the
terms uoligopolyi =
λi
η
P and uoligopsonyi =
φi

W , respectively. Thus, equation 6 is
written as:
(P −W )−MCi = uoligopolyi + uoligopsonyi (8)
Both terms, uoligopolyi and u
oligopsony
i , are non–negative. This allows us to write
the following inequality:
(P −W )−MCi > 0 (9a)
P −W > MCi (9b)
Inequality 9b is analogous to the starting point of Kumbhakar et. al.′s (2012)
theoretical model. Following their methodology, we multiply both sides of the in-
equality by (
qi
Ci
) and add a non–negative term ui. Hence, inequality 9b is converted
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into the following equality:
(P −W ) qi
Ci
=
d lnCi
d ln qi
+ ui, ui > 0 (10)
The term ui in equation 10 accounts for both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic
distortions, since it is an increasing function of the terms uoligopolyi and u
oligopsony
i .
This way, ui is a measure of the sum of the mark–up in the output market and
the mark–down in the input market. Certain assumptions regarding the statisti-
cal distributions of the uoligopoly and uoligopsony terms would enable us to disentagle
and uniquely identify market power in the output (beef/pork) and the input (cat-
tle/hogs) markets separately. This approach is beyond the purpose of this article.
2.2 Translog processing cost function for the meat packing
firm
In order to estimate the nonnegative one–sided term ui of equation 10 we express
the meat processing cost function in a translog form (Lopez et al., 2015) and fol-
low Kumbhakar et. al.′s (2012) methodology. The non–farm factors of productions
employed by meat packers at the processing stage are capital, labor, material and en-
ergy. The translog processing cost function for the ith meat packing firm is assumed
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to take the following form:
lnCi = β0 + βq ln qi +
1
2
βqq (ln qi)
2 + βqt ln qi t
+βqk ln qi lnwK + βqL ln qi lnwL + βqM ln qi lnwM
+βqE ln qi lnwE + βt t+
1
2
βtt t
2 + βLt lnwL t+ βKt lnwK t
+βMt lnwM t+ βEt lnwE t+ βK lnwK + βL lnwL + βM lnwM
+βE lnwE +
1
2
βKK (lnwK)
2 +
1
2
βLL (lnwL)
2 +
1
2
βMM (lnwM)
2
+
1
2
βEE (lnwE)
2 + βKL lnwK lnwL + βKE lnwK lnwE
+βKM lnwK lnwM + βLE lnwL lnwE + βLM lnwL lnwM
+βME lnwM lnwE
(11)
where qi is the processed meat (beef or pork) output, wK=price of capital, wL=price
of labor, wM=price of material and wE=price of energy. The time index t is included
to account for technological progress. We impose symmetry and linear homogeneity
(Binswanger, 1974) in equation 11. Imposing symmetry means that: βLK = βKL,
βLE = βEL, βLM = βML, βKM = βMK , βKE = βEK and βME = βEM . In order to
impose homogeneity, we normalize all prices with respect to the price of material.
Through equation 11, with symmetry and homogeneity imposed, the expression
for
∂ lnCi
∂ ln qi
is:
∂ lnCi
∂ ln qi
= βq + βqq ln qi + βqt t+ βqK ln
wK
wM
+
βqL ln
wL
wM
+ βqE ln
wE
wM
(12)
Substituting equation 12 into equation 10 we get the stochastic version of the
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profit maximizing relationship for the meat packing firm:
(P −W ) qi
Ci
= βq + βqq ln qi + βqt t+ βqK ln
wK
wM
+ βqL ln
wL
wM
+βqE ln
wE
wM
+ ui + ei (13)
The term (P − W ) is the farm–wholesale margin, as reported by the United
States Department of Agriculture – Economic Research Service (2016a,b), for each
one of the meat products of interest in this study. The composed error term (ui+ei)
in equation 13 is no different than the one from a stochastic cost frontier model.
Equation 13 can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method which is com-
monly used to estimate a stochastic cost frontier. The maximum likelihood method
is based on the distributional assumption of the errors. Following the literature
(Kumbhakar et al., 2012; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003), the distributional assump-
tions regarding the terms ui and ei are: ui is a normal variable truncated at zero
from below, i.e. ui ∼ N+(0, σ2ui), and ei is the usual two-sided normal noise term,
i.e. ei ∼ N(0, σ2ei). The present study assumes that the profit maximizing firm
operates efficiently. Hence, unlike the stochastic frontier analysis approach, ui does
not measure inefficiency in production. Instead, it measures inefficiencies due to the
firm’s anti-competitive behavior. More specifically, the term ui captures aggregate
market power, i.e. the sum of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic power exercised by the
meat packing firm. We will refer to ui as the market power term or market power
component.
2.3 Stochastic frontier estimator of the degree of market power
In a manner analogous to Kumbhakar et al. (2012), we measure the degree of market
power exercised by the meat packing firm as:
θi =
(P −W )−MCi
MCi
(14)
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The value of θi measures the degree of market power as the percentage difference
between the farm–to–wholesale price spread and the marginal processing cost. If
there is no market power presence, the farm–to–wholesale price spread is equal to
the marginal processing cost and we get the relationship of equation 7. This result
indicates that no market power is exercised by the ith meat–packing firm in both
the input and the output markets, since the value of θi is equal to zero.
Multiplying and dividing equation 14 by (
qi
Ci
) we get:
θi =
(qi/Ci)
(
(P −W )−MCi
)
(qi/Ci)MCi
(15a)
θi =
ui
∂ lnCi /∂ ln qi
(15b)
Employing the expression of equation 15b along with the estimated value of ui
from equation 13, we can estimate θi as:
θˆi =
uˆi
βˆq + βˆqq ln qi + βˆqt t+ βˆqK ln
wK
wM
+ βˆqL ln
wL
wM
+ βˆqE ln
wE
wM
(16)
In the case where the ith meat–packer exerts oligopoly and/or oligopsony power,
the estimated value of θi will be greater than zero.
3 Aggregate model
The absence of panel data on firm-level suggests that we can neither estimate the
market power term ui nor the degree of market power θi for each individual meat
packing firm. This limitation leads us to consider the problem at industry level,
where aggregate data for the U.S. meatpacking sector are available.
Following the literature (Azzam and Andersson, 2008; Perloff et al., 2007), we
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multiplying through equation 6 by ( qi
Q
) and summing across the N firms of the
industry. This way, we obtain the aggregate supply relation:
(P −W )−MC(Q) = P
η
Λ +
W

Φ (17)
In a manner analogous to Perloff et al. (2007) and Azzam and Andersson (2008) we
define: MC(Q) =
∑N
i=1
qi
Q
C ′i(qi, r, t) as the weighted industry marginal processing
cost, Λ =
∑N
i=1
qi
Q
λi as the weighted conjectural elasticity in the output market
and Φ =
∑N
i=1
qi
Q
φi as the weighted conjectural elasticity in the input market. In
all three relationships, the weights (
qi
Q
) are each firm’s market share in the output
market (or in the input market since we assume fixed proportions technology).
Equation 17 is the industry analogue of equation 6. Just like equation 6, the two
terms on the right hand side of equation 17 measure, respectively, oligopolistic and
oligopsonistic power exerted by each U.S. packing –beef and pork– industry.
Equation 17 is written in the following form:
(P −W )−MC(Q) = uoligopoly + uoligopsony (18)
where uoligopoly=
P
η
Λ and uoligopsony=
W

Φ.
Since both terms uoligopoly and uoligopsony assume nonnegative values, we can write
the following inequality:
(P −W )−MC(Q) > 0 (19a)
P −W > MC(Q) (19b)
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by (
Q
C
) and convert the above inequality
into an equality by adding adding a non–negative term u, we get:
(P −W )Q
C
=
d lnC
d lnQ
+ u, u > 0 (20)
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The term u in equation 20 is a function of both uoligopoly and uoligopsony.
Representing the industry’s processing cost function in a translog form and fol-
lowing the same procedure described in section 2, we arrive at the stochastic supply
relation:
(P −W )Q
C
= BQ +BQQ lnQ+BQt t+BQK ln
wK
wM
+BQL ln
wL
wM
+BQE ln
wE
wM
+ u+ e (21)
The main difference between equation 13 and equation 21 is that the former is
at firm level while the latter is at industry level. Estimation of equation 21 will
provide us with the estimate of the term u at market level. After estimating the
term u from equation 21, we can measure the degree of market power θ for the beef
and pork packing sectors, respectively, as:
θˆ =
uˆ
BˆQ + BˆQQ lnQ+ BˆQt t+ BˆQK ln
wK
wM
+ BˆQL ln
wL
wM
+ BˆQE ln
wE
wM
(22)
As equation 22 demonstrates, the estimate of the parameter θ depends on the
estimated value of the term u as well as on the relevant parameters of the translog
cost function.
4 Data and estimation results
The data used for the empirical analysis are annual time series for the U.S. beef and
pork packing sectors for the time period 1970–2009. Data were obtained from the
National Bureau of Economic Research–Manufacturing Industry Database (2016)
for SIC2011 (meatpacking industry) and from the United States Department of
Agriculture – Economic Research Service (2016a,b). A detailed description of the
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data and their sources can be found in the Appendix.
The non–farm inputs employed at the processing stage are divided into four
categories: capital (K), labor (L), material (M) and energy (E). Price and quantity
data on these factors of production are available for the U.S. red meat industry as
a whole (NBER – SIC2011).5,6 Capital is taken into account as a quasi-fixed input.
The annual user cost of capital (wK) was calculated as the sum of the real interest
rate and the depreciation rate.7 Time accounts for technological change and assumes
the values between one (t=1) for the year 1970 and forty (t=40) for the year 2009.
Table 1 provides the definition of variables used in estimating equation 21 and
presents their respective descriptive statistics for both packing industries examined
in this study.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the parameters of the translog cost function
employed in estimating equation 21, for the beef and pork packing sectors, respec-
tively.
Table 3 presents the estimates and (bootstrap) standard errors of the aggregate
degree of market power (θ) exercised by the U.S. beef and pork packing industries.8
Estimates are statistically significant in both sectors.
In the U.S. beef packing industry, the estimated value of the degree of market
power (θ) is 0.0491, suggesting that, on average, the farm-to-wholesale price spread
is 4.91% above the marginal processing cost. In the case of the U.S. pork packing
industry, the estimated value of the degree of market power (θ) is 0.0416. The value
of θ indicates that, on average, the farm-to-wholesale price margin is 4.16% above
the marginal processing cost.
The empirical results of this work suggest that rather a small percentage of the
5In order to quantitatively account for the quantity levels of K, L, M and E employed specif-
ically for the production of beef and pork respectively, we multiply the aggregate levels of the
aforementioned factors of production with the percentage of beef and pork output produced in
relationship with the rest of the meat products.
6NBER-SIC2011 database reports deflators for the f.o.p. material and energy.
7Assuming a 20-year equipment working life in the food processing industry and a linear form,
a value of 0.05 was applied to the depreciation rate (Lopez et al., 2015).
8The bootstrapped standard errors where obtained after 1000 repetitions.
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farm–to–wholesale price spreads, in both the beef and pork packing industries, can
be attributed to market power. These findings are comparable to studies that have
concluded that the magnitude of market power is not big enough to warrant con-
cern (Azzam and Schroeter, 1991; Schroeter, 1988; U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), 2009). Additionally, the results of this work are comparable to the
findings of Lopez et al. (2015). In their study, the value of the SFA estimator of the
degree of market power exercised in the U.S. meatpacking industry was as low as
3.7%.
On the other hand, the statistical significant findings of market power exertion
should make researchers and policy makers pay also attention on the argument that
even modest departures from perfect competition along the U.S. red meat marketing
supply chain should matter. According to Ward (2010), even a small degree of
market power can translate into quite significant welfare implications in the U.S.
red meat packing sector.
Oligopsony power matters for market efficiency to the extent that the farm input
is significant as a factor in producing the final product. Furthermore, if market power
is exercised at multiple stages along the supply chain, deadweight (efficiency) losses
can become quite significant, approaching one quarter of the total market surplus
that would be available under perfect competition (Sexton et al., 2007).
From a policy perspective, market intermediaries with even a modest degree
of market power can capture large shares of the benefits from policies intended to
benefit producers of the farm/primary input. As Sexton (2013) points out, the
distributional effects of market power exercised by market intermediaries are much
greater than the pure efficiency consequences. Hence, specific policies that are de-
signed to help farmers and quite frequently consumers, might not have the desirable
effect due to the presence of modest amounts of market power.
16
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to measure the aggregate degree of market power
in the U.S. beef– and pork– packing industries with the use of the recently devel-
oped stochastic frontier estimator of market power. The theoretical model of this
article allows the possibility to examine for the presence of aggregate market power
in both the input (cattle/hogs) and the output (beef/pork) markets. The SFA es-
timate of market power provides us with a measure of the sum of oligopolistic and
oligopsonistic power exerted by U.S. meat packers.
The empirical results of this study indicate that the U.S. red meat packing
industry exerts rather a small degree of market power. In the case of the U.S.
beef packing industry, the estimate of the degree of market power suggests that, on
average, the farm–wholesale price spread is 4.91% above the marginal processing
cost. In the U.S. pork packing sector, the estimated value of the degree of market
power indicates that, on average, the farm–wholesale price spread is 4.16% above the
marginal processing cost. Hence, based on the empirical findings of this study, we
can conclude that only a small percentage of the farm–to–wholesale price margins,
in both the beef and pork packing industries, can be attributed to market power.
The outcome of this study should be interpreted in light of data limitations
and model construction. First of all, a more appropriate data set would contain
information on the exact number of inputs employed exclusively for beef and pork
production respectively. Unfortunately, annual data from the Census are available
only for aggregate red meat output. Secondly, the relevant unit of observation in an
imperfectly competitive model for the U.S. meat industry is the meat packing firm.
Until data on firm level become available, aggregation is the only avenue in order
to estimate the aggregate degree of market power exercised by meat packers when
procuring live cattle/hogs and when selling beef/pork.9
9As Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) point out, little can be known about how the presence or
absence of market power is obscured by too much or too little aggregation.
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Finally, one of the biggest challenges for future research is to develop a model
where the oligopolistic and oligopsonistic distortions can be disentangled from each
other and uniquely measured by the SFA estimator of market power. This would
enable the researcher to test for market power in the output (beef/pork) and the
input (cattle/hogs) markets separately. This means that one would be able to es-
timate an oligopoly and an oligopsony component, namely uoligopoly and uoligopsony.
Statistically significant estimates for these two terms would indicate the presence (or
not) of market power in the output and/or in the input markets respectively. Among
other things, certain assumptions for the statistical distribution of the uoligopoly and
uoligopsony terms would be required.
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Appendix
Description of the variables and their sources are as follows:
Source: NBER– CES Manufacturing Industry Database / SIC2011 (meatpacking)
L = Production worker hours (million hrs)
WL =
Production worker wages (million $)
L
WK = interest rate + depreciation rate
WM = Deflator for MATCOST (1987=1.00)
WE = Deflator for ENERGY (1987=1.00)
Source: United States Department of Agriculture – Economic Research Service
Q = Commercial beef/ pork production (carcass weight, million lbs)
(P −W ) = Farm–wholesale price spread (cents per retail pound equivalent)
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Tables
Table 1: Variable definition and descriptive statistics (equation 21)
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Beef–packing industry:
(P −W ) Farm–wholesale spread (cents/lb) 24.6981 7.8409 12.6417 41.5417
Q Beef (billion lbs) 24.0809 1.7420 21.0890 27.0900
C Cost (million $) 28.9923 6.1566 13.3224 39.2634
wK Price of capital 0.0443 0.0237 0.0001 0.0872
wL Price of labor ($/hr ) 8.8326 2.4959 4.0386 13.7200
wM Price of material 0.9056 0.2050 0.4150 1.1660
wE Price of energy 1.0329 0.4231 0.2150 1.8210
t Time trend (1=1970, 40=2009) 20.5 11.7 1 40
Pork–packing industry:
(P −W ) Farm–wholesale spread (cents/lb) 29.7006 6.4591 19.8667 42.2750
Q Pork (billion lbs) 16.6199 3.0849 11.3150 23.3469
C Cost (million $) 20.3394 6.6155 8.3445 34.5104
wK Price of capital 0.0443 0.0237 0.0001 0.0872
wL Price of labor ($/hr ) 8.8326 2.4959 4.0386 13.7200
wM Price of material 0.9056 0.2050 0.4150 1.1660
wE Price of energy 1.0329 0.4231 0.2150 1.8210
t Time trend (1=1970, 40=2009) 20.5 11.7 1 40
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Table 2: Parameter estimates of supply relationship (eq. 21)
Parameter Est. value Std. error
Beef–packing industry:
BˆQ 120.89 7.72∗∗∗
BˆQQ −16.035 0.738∗∗∗
BˆQt 0.1996 0.0512∗∗∗
BˆQK −0.4087 0.3589
BˆQL 25.574 3.047∗∗∗
BˆQE −3.738 1.699∗∗
Pork–packing industry:
BˆQ −81.934 5.820∗∗∗
BˆQQ 1.019 0.392∗∗∗
BˆQt 0.018 0.057
BˆQK −1.353 0.354∗∗∗
BˆQL 44.054 2.979∗∗∗
BˆQE −17.781 2.093∗∗∗
(’***’, ’**’, ’*’): 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimates of the degree of market power (eq. 22)
Parameter Est. value Std.error 95% Confidence Interval
Beef–packing insustry:
Degree of market power ( θˆ) 0.0491 0.0006 (0.0479, 0.0503)
Pork–packing insustry:
Degree of market power ( θˆ) 0.0416 0.0004 (0.0408, 0.0424)
Note: Standard errors were obtained with the bootstrap method.
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